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The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
23-12-2004, 08:39 AM,
#1
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
....with apologies if you've seen it before.

You are the winner of a TV quiz show.
As your prize you are allowed to choose one of three boxes.
Two of the boxes each contain a cheque for £100.
The other box contains a cheque for £10,000.
The quiz master knows what is in each box.
He tells you that you can choose a box but not open it, which you do.
He will then open one of the other boxes and show you what is in it.
He will choose a box with £100 cheque in it and show you the cheque for £100.
He will then ask you if you would like to change your mind and pick the other remaining box or stick with your original choice.
Should you:-

A) Keep to the original choice.
B) Do what ever you like as the chances of winning the £1000 are the same for each box namely one chance in two.
C) Change your mind and go for the other remaining box.

Confused Give your answer as A or B or C.
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23-12-2004, 01:10 PM,
#2
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
Bastard.
Run. Just run.
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23-12-2004, 04:37 PM,
#3
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
Cosh the host and open the lot. Next . . .

BTW, have you tried Andy's latest game, Speedy Santa - it is HORRIBLY addictive. (9.029 best time, 32,120th in the world)

The harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph

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23-12-2004, 10:24 PM,
#4
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
The answer is C.

You should always change your mind and take the box that the quiz master left. That's because of the three scenarios possible for the quiz master, two of the three always involve the box that he leaves as being the big prize box. Therefore you increase your chances to two out of three of being correct if you change your mind. If you stick with your initial choice, you stay with the one in three chance.

It's a bit like when I go for a run. If I do an out and back, I increase the chances that I will get injured at the furthermost point from home. If I do a number of smaller loops, I instead increase my chances of feeling knackered after one loop, pulling out, commiserating with beer and ice cream (not simultaneously) and feeling wretched for the rest of the day. If however, I email SP and ask for advice, I know I increase my chances of success if I do the exact opposite to what he suggests.

Of course if I just stay home and read the RC Forum, I even further increase my chances of failure by getting stuck in threads like this... er... hmm...
Run. Just run.
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23-12-2004, 10:36 PM,
#5
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
MLCM is right I think, though until he posted that reasoning, I would have said "May as well stick with the original choice - it makes no difference."

Yes of course, the intervention of the host reduces the uncertainty factor.

Australians are so bloody annoying.
El Gordo

Great things are done when men and mountains meet.
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24-12-2004, 09:10 AM,
#6
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
andy Wrote:Yes of course, the intervention of the host reduces the uncertainty factor.

Does it? Are you not making an assumption as to whether the host wants a winner?

When this dilemma was first dicussed there were professors of mathematics who though there was a 50 50 chance with the remaining two boxes and other professors of mathematics who disagreed.



And yes, Aussies are tediously annoying. Big Grin
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26-12-2004, 11:22 PM,
#7
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
So what you're saying is that you don't know either?
Run. Just run.
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27-12-2004, 09:46 AM,
#8
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
There is no absolute right answer since it depends on certain assumptions, but the concensus agrees with MLC Man, so, although it pains me to say this, well done to the Aussie. Sad

Here's the explanation....
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27-12-2004, 10:06 AM,
#9
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
The probabilities of winning are around 67% if you switch and 33% if you don't.

First of all, the following facts are critical to a correct understanding of the problem, and need to be stated more explicitly:

1. The host is not malicious. He doesn't just offer a chance to switch when the contestant's original guess is correct. Rather, he always offers the chance. (With a malicious host, it would always be better to stick to your original guess, since the very fact the host gave you a chance to change your mind would mean that your guess was correct!)
2. The host knows where the £10,000 is. When he opens a door to reveal £100, that wasn't an accident; he's never going to open the door that reveals the biggie!


One way to look at the problem is this. If you adopt the non-switching strategy, you will win whenever your original guess was correct (which has a 1/3 probability of happening), and lose otherwise. If you adopt the switching strategy, you will lose whenever your original guess was correct, but you will win whenever your original guess was wrong (which has a 2/3 probability of happening).

This is a good argument in favour of the 1/3, 2/3 theory, but it doesn't explain what's wrong with the 1/2, 1/2 theory. After all, it seems perfectly reasonable that, if a door is opened revealing £100, there should now be a 50-50 chance of the £10,000 being behind one of the remaining two doors.
The key is this. That 1/2, 1/2 theory would be correct if the host opened a door completely at random, and it happened to reveal £100. But (from item 2 above) we know that the host will never open the door revealing £10,000. So there is additional information revealed by the host's choice of which door to open, besides the obvious information that that door revealed £100.

Suppose you choose door 1 and the host opens door 2 (meaning the £10,000 is either behind door 1 or door 3). Although it's true that the basic probabilities of the £10,000 car being behind door 1 or door 3 are equal, that's not the relevant issue here. Instead, we are after the conditional probabilities that £10,000 is behind door 1 or door 3, given that the host opened door 2.

What this means is: think of playing the game many, many times. Obviously, on average the big prize will be behind door 1, 1/3 of these times, behind door 2 1/3 of these times, and behind door 3 1/3 of these times. So, out of all the times you play the game, the proportion that have £10,000 behind door 1 is equal to the proportion that have £10,000 behind door 3.
But the question for us is: if we restrict our attention only to those cases in which you chose door 1 and the host opened door 2, what proportion of those games have £10,000 behind door 1, and what proportion have £10,000 behind door 3? The answers are now no longer equal.

First, think intuitively. On average, for every 6 times you play the game and choose door 1, there will be 2 times when £10,000 is behind door 1 (in which case the host might open either door 2 or door 3, so that means 1 time out of the 6 the host will open door 2, and 1 time out of the 6 the host will open door 3). Also, on average, there will be 2 times when £10,000 is behind door 2 (in which case the host must open door 3), and there will be 2 times when £10,000 is behind door 3 (in which case the host must open door 2).
So on average, for every six times you play the game and choose door 1, there will be

· one time when £10,000 is behind door 1 and the host opens door 2
· one time when £10,000 is behind door 1 and the host opens door 3
· two times when £10,000 is behind door 2 and the host opens door 3
· two times when £10,000 is behind door 3 and the host opens door

Out of all the three times when the host opens door 2, one of them has £10,000 behind door 1 and two of them have it behind door 3. So, out of all the times when you choose door 1 and the host opens door 2, on average 1/3 of those times have £10,000 behind door 1 and 2/3 of those times have 310,000 behind door 3. That's why switching gives you a 2/3 chance of winning.

The way this is formalized mathematically is as follows. Suppose door 1 is your choice. Let A be the event that £10,000 is behind door 1, and B the event that the host opened door 2. What we want is the conditional probability of A, given B. This is the probability of (A and B) divided by the probability of B.

The probability of A is one third (£10,000 has a 1/3 chance of being behind door 1). The probability of (A and B) is one-half the probability of A (since when £10,000 is behind door 1 the host might open either door 2 or door 3, with equal probability). So the probability of (A and B) is 1/6.
The probability of B is one half.

Therefore, the conditional probability of A given B is (1/6)/(1/2) = 1/3.
Similarly, if C is the event that £10,000 is behind door 3, the probability of C is one third, and the probability of (C and B) is also one-third (since when £10,000 is behind door 3 the host has no choice but to open door 2).
Therefore, the conditional probability of C given B is (1/3)/(1/2) = 2/3.
That's a mathematical justification of the fact that switching gives you a 2/3 chance of winning, while sticking with your original choice gives you only a 1/3 chance.

Notice what would be different if the host did not know where £10,000 was and simply opened a door that just happened to reveal £100. In that case, one should ask for the probability that £10,000 is behind door 1 given that the host opened door 2 and given that the door the host opened revealed £100. If you work out that probability, it turns out to be 1/2.

....I really should get out more. Wink
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27-12-2004, 05:07 PM,
#10
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
. . . has anyone seen my will to live? I seem to have lost it on this thread . . .

The harder the conflict, the more glorious the triumph

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27-12-2004, 10:39 PM,
#11
The Christmas Eve Eve, statistical dilemma
Ah, I wondered whose that was. We parcelled it up and put it over on the cricket forum... should be safe there.
Run. Just run.
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